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In a signaling equilibrium, countries that buy debt back get debt
relief.  Those that do not buy debt back do not get debt relief.
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Debt  and  International  Finance
Why don't  all indebted countries promote  lar, the "impatience rate" of the debtor's govem-
buybacks (including debt exchanges and debt-to-  ment.
equity swaps)?  Why do some countries promote
buybacks only part of the time?  And why are  Acharya and Diwan show that debt
debt buybacks the mechanism for debt reduction  buybacks can credibly reveal a debtor country's
favered by intemational public policy?  willingness to invest and to repay in the future
when offered relief today.  In equilibrium,
To solve the puzzle of attitudes toward debt  countries that buy back  "-bt get debt relief and
buybacks, Acharya and Diwan use a model that  those that do not buy back debt do not get debt
combines considerations of debt overhang with  relief.
the possibility of asymmetrical information
between debtor countries and their creditors.  Acharya and Diwan tested and failed to
reject two imp'ications of their model:
In this environment, a debt overhang may
create disincentives fcr a country to undertake a  * That banks systematically grant debt relief
wonhwhile investment, and debt relief may  to countries that have a swap program in place.
induce the country to invest and to increase its
output, raising future debt repayments.  * That the secondary market price e[ country
debt, conditional on a swap, is higher than the
But creditors cannoi directly observe the vari-  debt price, conditional on no swap.
ables that determine this choice, and in particu-
This paper is a product of the Debt and Intemational Finance Division, Interna-
tional Economics Department. Copies are available free from the World Bank,
1818 H Street NW, Washington DC 20433.  Please contact Sheilah King-Watson,
room S8-025, extension 33730 (24 pages with tables).
The PPR Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work under way in the Bank's Policy, Planning, and Research
Complex. An objective of the series is lo get these findings out quickly, even if presentations are less than fully polished.
The findings, interpretations. and conclusions in these papers do not necessarily represent official policy of the Bank.
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is at  the World Bank.  We thank  Stijn Claessens.  Stanley  Fischer.  Ken Froot,  Homil  Kharas.  and
Ken Rogoff for helpful  comments.  While we address  the  same issue we had  In an earlier  paper
(June  1987), "Debt Conversion  Schemes  of Debtor Countries  as a Signal for Creditworthiness:
Theory and  Evidence," the  current  paper  is substantially  different  in the  theory and  tests.1.  Introdu¢tlnm:
The coercial  bank  debt  burden  faced  by  cway  developing  countries  has  created
a global  crisis.  To mitigate  this  crisis,  recent  agreements between  comiercial  banks
and  their  debtor  countries  have  encouraged  various  forms  of  voluntary  debt  pre-
payments,  such  as,  buybacks,  debt  exchanges  and  debt  to  equity  swaps.'  These
agreements  have  raised  the  amount of debt  conversions  from a mere $1 billion  in  1984
to  $21 billion  in  1988.2  Several  creditor  nations  haVe recently  extended  official
support  to  include  voluntary  debt  conversion  more  formally  in  the  debt  reduction
strategy. 3 The  International  Monetary  Fund,  the  World  Bank,  and  the  Japanese
government have,  as  a result,  agreed  to  fund  ($34 billions  committed as of June  1989)
marker  basad  debt  reduction  schemes within  "menu" driven  rescheduling  agreemnts.
The main argument  in  favor  of  debt  buybacks  and  other  voluntary  debt  reduction
plans  has  been  that  debtors  can  improve  their  welfare  by  capturing  a  part  of  the
discount  at  which their  debt  trades  in  the  secondary  market.  (See,  e.g.,  Sachs  and
Huizinga  (1987)].  This  argument  does not  consider,  however,  the  implicit  nature  of
the  international  debt  contracts.  These contracts  specify  repayment  schedules  that
sovereign  countries  might  not  be willing  (or  able)  to  honor  in  toto.  Indeed,  Bulow
and Rogoff  (1989a)  have  recently  shown in  a  dynamic model of  international  lending
that  "debtors  can  sometimes successfully  negotiate  partial  defaults  or  "rescheduling
agreements.'"  [See  also  Fernandez  and  Rosenthal  (1989).]  If  the  discount  in  the
secondary  market  debt  price  fully  reflects  the  expacted  partial  default  in  the  future
repayments by  the  debtor  country,  the  debtors  gain  less  '-.  spending  a  dollar  for
buybacks  than  in  using  the  same dollar  for  domestic  investment  or consumption.  [See,
e.g.,  Bulow and Rogoff  (19S9b)  and Claessens  and Diwan (1989). ]4  Thus,  when lenders
and  borrowers  are  symmetrically  informed,  buybacks  seem to  be  mere  concessions  to
the  creditors.  Why then  some indebted  developing  countries  promote  market  based
buybacks  (including  debt  exchanges  and  debt  to  equity  swaps),  and  why is  such  a
promotion  the  official  goal  of 4nternational  public  policy?
In  this  paper,  we attempt  to  explain  this  puzzle  in  a  model  that  combines  debt
overhang  considerations  with  the  possibility  of  asymmetry of  information  between
debtor  countries  and  their  creditors.  The  debt  overhang  (high  enough  debt)  may
distort  a country's  incentives  to  invest,  as  it  imposes an implicit  tax  on  investment
returns.  By providing  debt  relief  (debt  forgiveness  or  rescheduling  at  concessional
1~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~'interest  rates)  in  a  situation  of  debt  overhang,  creditors  may increase  their  net
payoffs  if  the  country  can be  induced  to raise  investment  and repayments.  [See Sachs
(1989),  Krupmn  (1989),  Corden (1988),  and Helpman (1988).]  But  since  retaining  the
option  to  collect  the  whole  debt  is  also  valuable,  creditors  would  like  to  provide
debt  relief  only  when the  debtor  country  is  truly  willing  to  respond  with  large
enough investment,  leading  to  debt  repayments  in  future.  This  raises  a  problem  of
screening  in  the  absence  of  binding  mechanisms,  since  every  indebted  nation  would
attempt  to  receive  debt  relief  by  promising  to  undertake  adjustment  policies  of
increasing  investmnt  and  improving  repayment  capacity.  We model  a  country's  true
willingness  to  adjust  by  the  subjective  discount  rate  which  is  used  by  its  decision
makers  to  evaluate  intertemporal  tradeoffs  between  the  current  and  the  future
consumption.  We analyze  equilibria  in  two cases:  (1)  when the  debtors'  discount
rates  are  observable  (the  case  of  symmetric  information),  and  (2)  when the  discount
rates  are  unobservable  by  the  banks  (the  case  of  asymmetric  information).  We show
that  when the  banks  observe  the  discount  rates,  they  can benefit  by  offering  debt
relief  only  when the  discount  rate  is  low enough,  in  comparison  with  the  rate  of
return  on  domestic  investment.  In  the  symmetric  informational  equilibrium,  there
are  no  buybacks,  and  debt  relief  is  offered  to  patient  countries  (with  low discount
rates)  but  not  to  impatient  ones.  In  the  case  of  asymmetric  information,  however,
we show the  existence  of  an  informational  equilibrium,  as  defined  in  Spence  (1973)
and Riely  (1979).  In this  equilibrium,  banks  offerirg  debt  relief  only  to  countries
that  engage  in  buybacks  screen  countries  that  are  truly  willing  to  increase
investment  and  improve debt  repayments  from those  that  are  unwilling.  Intuitively,
debt  reliefs  increase  the  future  consumption  of  a  country  as  they  lower  future  debt
repayments,  whereas  debt  buybacks  involve  an  inmediate  cost,  lowering  the  current
consumption.  If  a  country's  discount  rate  is  sufficiently  low,  the  present  value
of  debt  relief  may exceed  the  immediate cost  of buybacks,  and this  country  will  seLf-
select  to  prouote  a buyback program when banks  offer  debt  relief.  On the  other  hand,
rational  banks  will  offer  debt  relief  only  when their  net  receipts  are  expected  to
increase.  As  banks  can  extract  up  to  a  maxlmum  possible  fraction  of  a sovereign
country's  output,  given  the  implicit  nature  of  the  debt  contract,  debt  relief  may
increase  the  net  debt  repayments  when relief  can  induce  the  country  to  undertake
sufficient  number  of  positive  net  present  value  projects.  Countries  with  lower
2discount  rates  ar  mor  woiLoly  (than  others)  to  undertake  sufficiently  higher  number
of  positive  net  present  value  projects.  It  is  thus  in  the  interest  of  the  banks  to
offer  debt  reliefs  to  a  country  which seLf-sela cts  a buyback program,  as  it  reveals
a  lower  discount  rate  indicating  that  the  country  will  undertake  more positive  net
present  value  investments  leading  to  hi8her  debt  repayments  to  banks.  We formally
show the existence  of  this  informational  equilibrium  and derive  testable  implications
in  Section  3.  In  this  equilibrium,  sam  debtor  countries  and  their  creditors
exchange  concessions,  with  the  countries  buying  back  some of  their  debt  and  their
creditors  offering  them  debt  relief.  Debt  relief  is  not  offered  to  the  countries
that  do not  engage in  debt  buybacks.  In Section  4,  we construct  an econometric  model
to  test  and  fail  to  reject  these  implications:  (1)  banks  systematically  grant  debt
relief  to  countries  when an operational  debt-equity  program is  in  place;  and  (2)  the
secondary  market  debt  price,  conditional  on existence  of  a  swap program,  is  higher
than  the  debt  price,  conditional  on no  such  program.  In  Section  5,  we conclude  by
discussing  the  recent  global  initiatives  for  easing  the  debt  burden.
2.  A  Model of  Debt  Duyback, Debt Relief,  and  Investment
We consider  the  operation  of  a  country  over  two dates,  denoted  by  t-O,1.  The
country  has  an  outstanding  comercial  bank  debt  of  D dollars,  and  is  contractually
required  to  pay  the  bank  at  t-l  the  sum  D less  any  amount of  debt  bought  back  and
any amount of  debt  relief  granted  by  the  bank.  Whether or not  the  country  buys back
some  of  its  debt  (assumed  to  take  place  only  at  t-O),  is  denoted  by  strategy,  a  z
(B (buyback),  andk  N (no-buyback)).  Given o-B,  the  country  is  ass.umed to  buyback  a
fixed  amount of  debt,  denoted  by  d e  (O,D),  where  d  is  endogenously  determined  in
equilibrium.  We denote  the  amount of  debt  buyback by  a  variable  d,  where  d.O  iff
-in and  d-d  iff  c-N. 5 Given o-B,  the  country  buys  its  debt  at  t-O  at  the  prevailing
market  price  p  (per  $1  of  face  value  of  debt),  which  is  endogenously  determined  in
equilibriun.  While  the  buyback  operation  reduces  the  country's  bank-debt  to  D-d,
it  involves  a  transfer  of  dp  dollars  worth  of  domestic  assets  from the  country  at
t-O.  We assum  that,  conditional  on  the  country's  action,  the  bank  may offer  the
country  a debt  relief  of  p (D-d.p2O) dollars  at  t-O,  if  doing so  is  profitable.  This
debt  relief  (reduced  interest  rates,  new money,  or  out-right  write-off)  is  assumed
to  decrease  the  country's  contractual  repayment  to  D-d-p  dollars  at  t-l  after  the
3voluntary  byback  of  d  dollars.
The  comtry  is  a_md  to  have  a known  ndowmnt  of  QD  dollars  at  tO.  We asau
that  soon  after  date  0  (dusted  by  tO'),  the  country  undergoes  an  unceLtain  sta:e
of  its  economy, denoted  by  w,  which  results  in  an  endowment of  QC, at  t-l.  Fbr
slzlicity,  w  is  assu md  to  take  one  of  two possible  values  at  0:  g  (good),  and  b
(bad),  such  that  QU  > Qbb  > 0.  While  state  wE(g,b)  is  uniwnn  at  t-0,  the
probability  of  its  occurrence,  s,,  is  assumbd to  be  coon  knowledge  at  t-0.  The
country  is  assmied  to  have  an  investmant  opportunity  (e.g.,  a  trade  or  a  fiscal
reform)  with  an  investint  outlay  of  I  dollars  at  t-O4. The country's  investment
strategy  at  t-04 ,  denoted  by  I,  can  thus  take  one  of  two possible  values,  0 and  I.
The  investomnt  strategy  at  t-O'  is  assumd  to  produce  p1  at  t-l,  where  p  is  equal
to  1 plus  the  rate  of  raturn  per  dollar  on  the  investwent.  The gross  output  of  the
country  at  t-l  is  thus  equal  to  the  sin  of  the  realised  endowmant and  the  production
achieved  by  the  investment  policy,  Qd+pI.  We assmu  that  the  bank  can  extract  a
uqi,.u  repayment  equal  to  a  fraction,  a  (a:l),  of  the  sovereign  country's  gross
output  at  t-l.  By this  ziplicit  nature  of  the  external  debt  contract,  the  country
repays  the  bank  at  t-l  an  am.mt:
(1)  RI(a,pJ,I)  - Min[D-d-p, *(CL@;I)],  w-g,b.
The  country  is assumed  to consume  the  remaining  part  of its  endowment  after
investment  and  payment  toward  the  retired  debt  at  t-O4,
(2)  C 0- C  - I - pd,
7and  the  remaining  part  of  its  output  after  repayments  at  t-l,
(3)  CI(V,P,I,W)  - Q4,+pIAI  Rl(o,p,I,).
We specify  that  the  objective  of  the  country's  decision-maker  at  t-W is  to  choose
an  investment  level  that  maximizes  the  following  utility  function  over  available
consumptions  at  t-O+,1:
4(4)  U(o,p,I ,,@)  C4  +  ^(O,P.I6,) 
where p,  the  decision  maors  discotmt  factor  over  one  period,  is  assumd  to  take
one  of  two  possible  values:  Pg ad  A,  with  I  > PA  > PL. where  rg is  1 plus  the  risk-
free  rate  of  interest  in  tth-  ;lobal  econay  and  the  country  is  assumed to  be  too
small  to  lmact r.8  The  p  re-rasents  the  co%mtry's  degree  of williwmss  to  adjust
its  policies  of  consutptlon  and  investuant.  The country  in  our  model is  either  type
H  (patient)  or  type  L  (impatient)  with  a  positive  probability  of  becoming  eithor
type.  We  have  assumed  the  subjective  discount  factors  Ps and A  to  be lower  than  the
global  discount  factor  Cl  ]  so  that  the  country  has  an  incentive  to  hold  foreign
debt.  We shall  analyze  two cases  involving  the  state  of  information  about  P:  the
case  of symmetric  information  where O is  cowmn knowledge,  and the  case  of  asymmetric
information  wnere  banks  and  other  investors  do  not  observe  the  8,  known to  the
country's  decision  maker.  [For  simplicity,  we  do  not  distinguish  the  country  (its
citizens)  from  its  decision  maker. I  In  any  case,  we  assume  that  A4.  P*¢.P.  SO
that  the  Incentive  to  undertake  the  project  purely  as an  investment  is  non negative.
This  allows  us  to  isolate  conditions  under  which  debt  overhang  may create  dis-
incentives  for  undertaking  the  (worthwhile)  investment,  and when debt  relief  measures
by  the  bank  may induce  the  country  to  undertake  the  investment.  The country's
problem  at  t-e!  [V  wE(g,b),  oE(B,N),  fie(A.,)]  is  thus:
(5)  Max  U(a,p,I,,w)  - (QC-I-pd)  + P[Q,4+pI  - Min[D-d-p,aQiopI]].
Ie(O,mI
Given  the  solution  of  (5),  a  set  of  inNestsment strategies  I*,  the  objective  of  the
country  at  t-O  is  to  maxlmize  its  expected  util'ty  to  choose  oe(B,N):
(6)  Maximize  U(o,p,I  ,P8,g)*  + U(v,p,I',P,b)rb.
oE(B,N)
Given  the  observed  action  a  of  the  cowntry,  the  bank  makes  an  inference  at  t-O  that
the  country's  true  i  is  A, and  then  derives  an  inferred  optimal  investment  strategy
for  the  country,  t.  [In  the  case  of  symnetric  information  AmP, and  tIr.]  Given
the  inferred  (M,t),  the  bank  is  assumed  to  maximize  its  expected  receipts  from the
5country  to  choose  debt  relief  P:
(7)  Ml imnz.  R 1(o,p,t,g)*G  +  Rl(a,p,t,b)wb.
We then  define  Nash equillbria  In  the  model as  followis:
9
Definition  of  Equillbrium:  The equilibrlum  In  the  game  aong  the  players  (the  bank
and  the  country)  comprises  of:  (i)  an  irnestment  strategy  r  which  solves  (5),  a
buyback  strategy  a  which  solves  (6),  inference  rules  (0,)  and  an  unmt  of  debt
relief  p  (given  A,  t)  which  solve  (7),  such  that  a is  optimal  given  p,  p is  optimal
given  a,  the  lnferences  are  rational  [e.g.,  in  fully  revealing  informational
equilibrLum,  p  ,  and  i  I'],  and  (ii)  the  prlce  of  debt  at  t-O  is  glven  by  [for  D-
d-p>O]:
(8) P(")  r  (Dd-p)  [Ru(,p,t,g)w  +  R(a,p,t,b)Wb].
The secondary  market  price  of  country  debt,  given  by  (8),  is  indeed  the
conditional  expectation  of  the  expected  receipts  per  dollar  of  debt  cutstanding,
given  the  coAntry's  buyback  strategy  and  the  bank's  relief  strategy;  where  the
expectation  is  evaluated  by  the  risk-adjusted  probability  (equivalent  martingale)
measure,  as  in  Harrison  and Kreps  (1979).  [Under this  measure  the  price  of  an asset
at  t-O  is  simply  equal  to  the  expected  future  payoffs  to  the  asset  at  t-l,  discounted
to  time  0 by  the  economy'  s  risk-free  rate.]
We  show the  existence  of  two  equilibria  of  interest,  one  in  the  case  of  symmetric
informatLon  and  the  other  in  the  case  of  asymetric  information  about  p.  The
asymmtric  informational  equilibrium  we  consider  is  fully  revealing  so  that
A(0(C))-B,  and  t(,)mI(,).  In  either  case,  the  investment  strategy  at  two*
which  solves  (5)  is  stated  in  Taima  1.
lemm  1:  Optimal  Investment  Strategy:  Given  dE-O,D),  and  pe(O,D-d),  the  country's
optimal  investment  strategy  for  we(g,b)  is  given  by:
(9)  1I  - I  iff  I(p-*)  2  Min[D-d-p,aQ>j+4I]  - Min(D-d-p,aQj X;
6r  - 0  otherwise,
wher:
(10)  X  - 0  for  D-d-p  S  oCi4,
(11)  X  - D-d-po  l  for  *C,  <  D-d-p  S a%.4aquI,
(12)  X - q"I-  for  D-d-p  > o04,40pI.
Proof:  It  follows  by  solving  (5)  for  dE(O,D)  and  pe(O,D-d).
Since  A4, the  country  will  optimally  invest  in  both  states  at t-0 4 if its
remaining  debt  (after  buyback  and  debt  relief),  D-d-p,  is  small  enough  such  that
the  inequality  in  (10)  holds. If  the  outstanding  debt  is  large  (such  that  (12)
holds),  the  country  will  optimally  invest  at  t-e0  oly if  (1-a)  O  ,  and  forgo  the
investment  otherwise.  The  country's  investment  strategy  thus  depeids  on  the  amnwt
of  buyback  d  and  debt  relief  p,  the  original  ammut  of  debt  D,  and  on the  other
parameters  according  to  (9)-(12).  In  this  paper,  we focus  on  a  scenario  (a  set of
parmeter  values)  in  which:
(A)  the  country  voluntarily  undertakes  tile  investment  in  at  last
one  state;
(B)  the  country  voluntarily  forgoes  the  investment  in  some  state,
if  the  debt  relief  is  zero,  but  can  be  induced  by  a  positive
debt  relief  to  undertake  the  investment;  and
(C)  the  bank  finds  it  profitable  to  offer  debt  relief  to  at  least
one  type  of  country  and no relief  to  another  type.
We ensure  (A) by  assuming  DKoQ.  (Then D-d-p  <  oQ, for  D2d20  and  D-d 242p,
implying  that  X-0 if  w-g,  and by  (9)-(10),  I*-I  since  *4].  To ensure  (B),  we note
that  since  there  are  two states,  the  country  can  forgo  the  investment only  in  state
w-b. Further,  if  (l-a)p  < * and a%jogI  < D,  then  it  can be  s'r-  fron  (9)  and  (12)
that  with  no  debt  relief  and no buyback the  country  will  forgo  the  investment  in  the
bad  state,  but  by  a  sufficient  munt  of  debt  relief  it  can  be  induced to  buyback
and undertake  the  investment  by'(9)  and  (11).  We  therefore  specify  the  following:
(13)  ob+o4I  < D < oQ,
(14)  (l-o)# <  t  p - i.  7
7Condition  (14)  au_ts  enat  the  part  of  the  return  on  investment,  remaining  after
paysnt  toward  the  bank  losn  (for  w"b),  is  less  than  the  subjective  discount  rate
of  the  country.  Undertaking  the  investent  is  therefore  not  attrretive  when the
level  of  debt  is  D and  the  unertain  state  turns  out  to  be  bad.  Given  (9).(14)  and
a  level  of  debt  D,  the  country  will  thus  invest  In  the  good state  and  not  invest  in
the  bad  state,  and  pay  the  bank oa,  at  t-I  if  the  bad  state  occurs  at  t-04 and pay
the  full  amount  D  at  t-l  lf the  good  state  occurs  at  toO.  Given  a  voluntary
buvback of  d,  the  mIlnIman  amount of  positive  debt  relief  that  can  induce  the  country
to  undertake  the  investmnt  if  state  is  bad  at  t-OC is  shown in  Lamma  2.
Lamc  2:  (a)  The minlm.u  debt  relief  that  can  induce  the  country  to  undarv.ake the
investsent  is  given  by:
(15)  p  -O  if  D-d <
Punz 1 D-d-o;).D.I(j*)  if  D-d 2  a%hb+I(pi.
(b)  The  maximm  amount  of  relief  that  the  bank  can  profitably  offer  the  country  is
given  by:
(16)  pr  - wb(D-d-oQT]-
(c)  The  optimal  debt  relief,  p,  is  given  by:  p*-PZn if  I(p-+)  2  w[D-d-oQj],  and
p-O  otherwise.
Praof:  See  the  Appendix.
Note  that  there  exists  a  positive  debt  buyback  d  which  the  country  can  choose
even  when  p3n  in  (15)  is  positive  since  (D-amb)I(p-*),  by (13)-(14)  as  qp  DI(p-
*).  Although  p,n  may  be  positive,  the  maximim  amount  of  relief  that  the  bank  can
profitably  offer  the  country  i8'  given  by (16);  this  solution  mans that  a  reduced
debt  repayment  in  the  good  state  is  ',  'set  by  an  increase  in  debt  repayment  in  the
bad  state.  Thus  an  optimal  p^  is  given  by  pi whenever  papmi..  Although  this
analysis  in  LeToa  2 is  similar  to  the  analysis  by  Froot  et.al.  (1988),9  Krugnan
(1987),  and  Sachs  (1988),  w^ focus  on equilibria  with  buyback  programs  under
8symmetric  and asyimmtrlc  lnformation,  whlch  are  not  consLdered  in  these  papers.
Since  there  are  t"o  possible  types  of  countries  in  the  econoqy,  we  enure  (C)  by
specifying  o  and A  an:
(17)  l(p-i)  >  vrgD-*R4a]  >  (  L
The  rational  bank's  debt  relief  would  clearly  not  exceed  [D-o43J,  Lzplying  that
[D  oQj  ln  (17)  is  the  maxinun  expected  cost  of  relief.  Thus,  (17)  means  that
(before  a  buybackl  the  lnvesnemt  surplus  tI(p-*,)j  when  the  country  is  type  H is
greater  than  the  modmax  expected  cost  of  relief,  and  conversely  when  the  country
is  type  L.  It  is  thus  potentially  profitable  for  the  bank  to  sacriflce  a  part  of
its  debt  in  the  good state  in  exchange for  an increased  repayment  (greater  than  o6)
in  the  bad  state  if  the  country  is  H  type  since  this  country  can  be  induced  to
increae  its  output  from  QD to  Qi+pI,  by  undertakLng  the  investmnt;  this  tradeoff
is  not  possible  for  the  L  type  country.  In  other  words,  given  a  debt  bEyback  d,
Lemma  2  and  (17)  would imply  that  '(46)-p?&O and  p"(AO)-O.
3.  Symmetric  and  Asymetrlc  Informational  Eqlulibria:
The first  inequality  in  (17)  suggests  that  if  the  bank  observes  the  type  of  the
country,  it  would  then  be  better  off  offering  a  positive  debt  relief  to  type  H
country,  who  would  be  better  off  undertaking  the  investment.  The bank  would  be
better  off  not  offering  debt  relief  to  the  L type  country,  Anho  would  then  find  it
optimal  to  not  undertake  the  investment.  In  this  symmetric  information  case,  a
buyback  of  debt  at  its  market  price  is  costly  to  either  type  of  country.  This
result  follows  since  the  market  price  of  a  dollar  of  debt  yields  the  global  rate  of
interest  rf-l,  whereas  the  benefits  (measured  in  terms  of  expected  utility)  of  debt
relief  yield  a  lower  rate  given  by  i-1,  #i#,#L- We state  and  formally  show the
existence  of  this  equilibrium  (under  syumtric  information)  in  the  following
proposition.
Proposition  1  (Symmetric  Information  Equilibrium):  Given  that  is  commn
knowledge:  (a)  the  optimal  investment  strategies  are:  I*(fi,w)  - I,  for  w-g,b;
I*(A,g)  - I  and  I*(#,,b)  - 0;  (b)  the  bank  offers  a  positive  debt  relief,  equal  to
9to  the  H type  country  and  a  relief  p(&)-O  to  the  country  L
type  coumtry;  (c)  neither  type  country  engage  in  boback  program:  0(p8)-o(PL).
i.a.,  d0.
Proof:  See  dhA  Appendix.
Proposition  1,  similar  to  Bulow and Rogoff  (1988),  does not  explain  why buybacks
take  place.  More importantly,  this  preposition  does  not  shed any  light  on why som
countries  engage  in  buyback programs,  whereas  ot&-rs  do not.  This  proposition  also
camnot  indicate  how the  secondary  market  debt  price  should  behave  in  equilibrium
with  respect  to  thie buyback by  a  country,  to  explain  our  emplrical  results  later.
Indeed,  if  O is  unobservable,  the  equilibrium  in  Proposition  1 no  longer  holds  since
every  country  (P.  or  L type)  may desire  to  get  the  debt  relief  by  mis-representing
itself.  In  the  next  proposition,  we  consider  the  case  of  asymmetric  information
about  8 to  show the  existence  an  equilibrium  where  the  H type  finds  it  optimal  to
buyback,  the  type  L does  not  find  it  optimal  to  buyback,  the  bank profitably  offers
a  posLtive  debt  relief  if  the  country  engages  in  buyback  and  no  relief  if  the
country  does  not.  We also  show that  in  this  equilibrium  the  secondary  market  debt
price  of  the  country's  debt  is  higher,  conditional  on  a  buyback  than  on  a  no-
buyback.
Proposition  2  (Asyammtric  Informational  Equilibrium):  When P is  not  observed  by  the
bank and by  the  investors,  then  there  exists  an equilibrium  in  which  (a)  for  p-s,PL:
I*(P,B,g)-II*(I  ,B,b);  I*(O,N,g)-I  and  I(P,N,b)-O;  (b)  3  dE(O,D) such  that  p(B)-D-
c4^-d-I(p-* 5)  >  0,  p(N)-O,  a(Al)-B,  o(p,)-N;  (c)  (°(O)B,  and  I(,o,) -
and  (d)  p(B)  >  p(N).
Proof:  See  the  Appendix.
The  basic  intuition  behind  the  informational  equilibrium  can  be  easily  described
by  the  two  necessary  conditions  for  existence,  derived  in  the  Appendix:
(Al)  d/rr  s  E(D-aQm)  - I(R-*)fr.Bn.
(A2)  d/rr  2(D-oQ)  - I(;-  *)]1T8#LF
10where  (Al)  guarantees  that  the  H-type  engages  in  buyback  and  (A2)  guarantees  that
the  L-type  does  not.  Under these  conditions,  dp(B)-d/rf  is  the  current  (t-0)  cost
of  buying  back  d dollars  of  facc. value  of bank  debt,  (D-Qb)  -I(  M-*5)-d+p(B)  is  the
corresponding  reduction  in  the  face  value  of  debt  outstanding  (by the  buyback  d,  and
debt  relief  p(B)).  After  such debt  reductions,  the  country  will  be  required  to  pay
d+p(B) dollars  less  in  the  future  (t-l),  if  d-d.  Thus,  (d+p(B))t$  is  the  country's
current  evaluation  of  the  future  cut  in  the  debt  repayment,  for  #-&A.  By (Al)  the
H type  would thus  find  it  beneficial  to  buyback,  and  given  (A2),  the  L-type  would
find  it  beneficial  to  not  buyback.  There  exists  ;E(O,D)  which  satisfies  (Al)-(A2)
such  that  a  separating  equilibrium  obtains  (since  ApA], and  a  positive  cut  in  the
nominal  debt  by  relief  and debt  buyback  is  mutually  optimal,  when feasible  [d+p(B)
- (Dc4Q,)-I(jA*)>O]  .10  In  this  equilibrium,  the  unobserved  ,  of  a  country  is  fully
revealed  by  the  buyback/no-buyback  action.  Since  the  L-country  does not  buyback and
therefore  does  not  get  debt  relief,  it  lands  up  defaulting  at  t-l  if  the  state  at
t-O+  turns  out  to  be  bad.  On the  contrary,  the  H-  type  country  repays  at  t-l  the
rescheduled  amount of  debt  (D-d-p(B)]  fully  whether  the  state  at  t-O+ is  w-g or  w-b.
It  should  then  be  clear  that  the  secondary  market  debt  price  of  the  country  that
engages  in  buybacks  should  be  more than  the  price  of  debt  of  the  country  that  does
not.  In  the  next  section,  we  test  and  fail  to  reject  this  implication  of  the
informational  equilibrium.
4. Tests  of  the  Model:
Using  the  monthly  data  obtained  for  17  highly  indebted  countries  that  have  not
received  voluntary  new  loans  since  1982,11  over  March  1985  through  December  1987
[from  World  Debt  Tables  and the  World  Development  Report  (World  Bank),  the
International  Financial  Statistics  (International  Monetary  Fund)],  we  test  the
following  two  implications  of  our  model:
(A)  Countries  promoting  -swap  programs  receive  higher
debt  reliefs,
and  (B)  the  secondary  market  debt  price  of  the  country
debt  is  higher,  conditional  on  swap,  than  the
debt  price,  conditional  on  no-swap.
11Our data  for  testing  (A) conidstr  of:  (1)  the  spread  between  the  interest  rates
charged  by  the  banks  on  now loans  to  the  countries  and  the  London Interbank  Offer
Rate  (LIBOR), and  (2)  the  amount  of  now money  (at  below  market  interest  rate)
received  by  a  country  as  a  percent  of  the  debt  service.  If  (A)  in  true,  then  the
spread  aver  LIBOR  should  be  lower  and  the  amount  of  new money loaned  should  be
higher  on  average  for  countries  that  swap than  for  countries  that  do not  swap.  To
test  (B),  we  used  monthly  data  on  the  secondary  market  debt  price  for  these  17
countries.
Table  I  presents  results  of  simple  F-tests  for  comparing  the  means of  these
three  variables  across  swap and  no-swap actions  of  these  countries.  The group  of
countries  that  swapped received  on  average  significantly  more new money (50%) from
their  lenders  than  the  group  of  countries  that  did  not  swap.  Lenders  charged
significantly  lower  interest  rates  (15%  more) on new loans  to  the  group of  countries
that  swapped than  on the  new loans  to  the  group  of  countries  that  did  not  swap.  The
price  if  secondary  market  country  debt  has  been  significantly  higher  for  the  group
of  countries  that  swapped than  for  countries  that  did  not  swap (16.5%).  These test
results  are  consistent  with  our  predictions  [Proposition  2],  although  they  are  not
exact  tests.  We hence  carry  out  more formal  tests  of  prediction  of  Proposition  2,
based  on  an econometric  formulation  of  endogenously  chosen  swap/no-swap  actions  of
countries  and  on  measurement  of  the  conditional  means  of  the  three  dependent
variables  that  are  realized  contingent  on  the  actions  chosen  by  the  countries.
4.1 Formulation  of  Tests  of  the  model:
In  this  section,  we specify  that  the  unobservable  subjective  discount  factor,  8,
of  a  country  is  a  continuous  random variable,  which  for  simplicity  is  assumed  t-  be
normal.12  The country's  decision  maker  first  observes  6  (which  may be  different
over  time)  and  then  announces  its  swap/no-swap  action. Based  on the  model  in
Section  3,  it  can  be  shown  that  the  swap  action  is  announced  if  P'8,  4here  6 is  the
threshold  of  0  implied  in  equilibrium  by  the  parameters  in  the  global  economy.  If
a  country  undertakes  a  swap program  whenever  6>0,  then  the  market  can  rationally
infer  this  decision  rule,  although  it  does  not  observe  0.  Thus  the  expected  value
of  the  dependent  variables,  as  a  function  of  other  observable  attributes  of  a
12country,  should  be  measured  contingent  or.  the  inferred  rational  rule:  the  country
swaps  whenever $Pb,  and  does  not  swap  otherwise.  Let  y  be  one  of  the  three
dependent  variables:  ratio  of  new  money to  the  total  debt  service  due  in  the  year,
spread  of  interest  rate  charged  in  excess  of  LIBOR,  and  the  log  of  secondary  market
debt  price.  Let  y-O'z+c,  where  z  is  a  vector  observables,  specified  later,  and  9
is  the  conforming  vector  of  coefficients.  We need  to  estimate  the  expected  value
of  the  dependent  variable  contingent  on  swap and  no-swap  actions:  E(yIz,#DB)  and
E(yjz,f  ). Clearly  then  the  expected  payoff  of  the  country,  y,  contingent  on  its
chosen  action  a,  can  be  written  as:  E(ylz,o)  - E(yIz,cDO)J+E(yIz,+s8  ('-J),  where
J-1  if  and only  if  the  country  swaps  and  J-0  otherwise.  We  also  specify:  a-p-y'z+(,
where  f  is  assumed to  be  normally  distributed,  and both  sides  of  this  equation  is
divided  by  the  standard  deviation  of  C so  that  the  resulting  I  is  unit  normal,  7  is
a vector  of  coefficients.  It  then  follows  that  E(yiz,#b  )  - 9'z+q('y'z)/0(yz)  and
E(yIz,PB)  - 8'z-q4(7'z)/[1-0(7'z)],  where i(+)  is  the  density  and 4(o)  is  the  cdf
a  standard  normal  distribution,  and q-Cov(f,c).  We can  then  estimate  q  as well
as  0  and  1  in  the  following  model:
(18)  y  '-  9'z + q[  4]-  q['  +
where  E(v|z,J)-O.  We  can  test  whether  E(yIz,S>,)  >  E(yIz,#5  0),  by  testing  whether
q>O  in  (18).  The  econometric  model  (18)  is  a  special  case  of  the  action-contingent
payoff  model  of Acharya  (1989),  or  of the  signalling  model  of  Acharya  (1988).
Although  (18)  can  be  estimated  by  non-linear  least  squares,  we  use  simpler  two stage
procedures,  as in  Acharya  (1988,1989).  In  the  first  stage,  we estimate  9 in  a
probit  model  in  which  J is  the  discrete  dependent  variable  and  z  is  the  vector  of
the  right  hand  side  variables.  In  the  second  stage,  we  estimate  (18)  by  OLS,  and
derive  the  correct  asymptotic  covariance  matrix  of the  coefficient  estimator. 13
Note  that  in  Heckman's  (1976)  two-stage  procedure,  terms  like  +(X)/¢(-)  are  used  to
correct  for  bias,  arising  from  sample  selection,  truncation,  or  censoring.  We  have,
however,  the  complete  sample  of data  on the  dependent  variables  over  the  two
possible  actions  of  the  countries  in  our  sample.  [It  is  unnecessary  for  us  to  group
the  data  according  to  whether  a  country  has  or  has  not  swapped.]
We  specify  z  as  the  following  pre-determined  variables:  (a)  LIBOR,  (b)  ratio  of
13total  external  debt  outstanding  to  the  gross  domestic  product  (GDP),  (c)  ratio  of
total  exchange  reserve  to  GDP,  (d)  ratio  of  investment  to  GDP,  (e)  ratio  of  total
debt  service  to  exchange  reserves,  and  (f)  ratio  of  trade  deficit  to  GDP of  a
country.  We collected  data  on  these  variables  from  various  publications:  the  World
Debt  Tables  and  the  World  Development  Report  (World  Bank),  and  the  International
Financial  Statistics  (International  Monetary  Fund).
4.2  Test  Results:
The  results  of  estimation  are  presented  in  Panels  A,  B and  C in  Table  2.  First,
we fail  to  reject  the  hypotheses  that  the  spread  over  LIBOR is  less  (and  the  log  of
debt  price  is  more),  conditional  on  swap action,  than  conditional  on  no-swap  action
of  a  country:  q  is  significantly  negative  in  Panel  A,  and  significantly  positive  in
Panel  C.  Although  statistically  insignificant,  q  is  positive  in  Panel  B,
indicating  that  the  new money  (as  a  fraction  of  total  debt  service)  is  also  more,
conditional  on  swap,  than  on  no-swap  action  of  a  country.  These  results  are
consistent  with  the  predictions  of  our  model."4
About  signs  of  the  other  coefficients,  0,  note  that  LIBOR is  negatively  related
to  spread  of  the  interest  rate  over  LIBOR since  the  interest  rate  charged  by  banks
is  much  less  variable  than  the  LIBOR.  When the  LIBOR goes  up,  the  spread  thus  goes
down.  The  amount  of  new money granted  by  banks  do  not  depend  significantly  on  the
LIBOR,  but  the  secondary  market  debt  price  goes  up  when  the  LIBOR goes  down,  as
expected.  The  ratio  of  total  debt  to  GDP  is  found  to  be  positively  related  to  the
spread,  negatively  related  to  the  debt  price,  as  expected  since  the  level  of  debt
is  inversely  related  to  the  probability  of  default.  [See  Edwards  (1985)  who obtains
similar  results.] Interestingly,  the  ratio  of debt  to  GDP is  not significantly
related  to  the  amount  of  new  money  granted. The  ratio  of  exchange  reserves  to  GDP
is  found  to  be  negatively  related,  although  insignificantly,  to  the  spread  [Edwards
(1983)],  and  positively  related  to  new  money  and  debt  price. The investment-GDP
ratio  is  positively  related  to  new  money  and  to  the  seconda.y  market  debt  price,  as
higher  investment-GDP  ratios  erhance  the  credit-worthiness.  The  spread  is  found  to
be  negatively  related  to  the  investment-GDP  ratio. The  debt  service  to  GDP  ratio
is negatively  relatee.  to the spread,  positively  related  to the new money,  and
positively  related  to  the  secondary  market  debt  price,  as  expected  [Feder  and  Just
14(1977)].  The trade  balance  to  GDP  ratio  is  positively  related  to  the  amont  of  now
money, positively  related  to  the  secondary  market  debt  price,  and negatively  related
to  spread,  as  expected  under  the  willingness-to-pay  approach.
5.  Concluding  Rearks
We showed  that  debt  buybacks  can  be  useful  in  resolving  the  debt  crisis  by
acting  as  credible  indicators  for  a  country's  willingness  to  respond  to  debt  relief
by  increasing  inwestment  and debt  repayLient.  In our  informational  equilibrium,  some
debtor  countries  and  their  creditors  exchange  concessions  and  share  the  burden  of
debt  reduction:  the  debtor  country  by  using  its  current  resources  to  pre-pay  a part
of  its  debt,  and  the  creditors  by  offering  debt  relief  in  the  form  of  new money,
reduced  interest  rate  in  the  rescheduled  loans,  or  outright  debt  write-offs.  On the
^ther  hand,  countries  that  experience  a  debt  overhang  but  do  not  buyback  som of
their  debt  reveal  that  they  are  unwilling  to  sacrifice  current  consumption  for  the
sake  of  future  consumption.  These  countries  in  t-urn  are  unwilling  to  undertake
sufficiently  high  level  of  investment.
It  is  tempting  to  interpret  the  recent  initiative  by  the  United  States  Treasury
Secretary  Brady  [endorsed  by  the  international  financial  institutions  (IFIs)]  as  an
attempt  to  devise  a  self  selection  mechanism,  offering  debt  relief  only  to  the
deserving  countries.  In  the  recent  Mexican deal,  $7 billion  of  credit  enhancements
were made (including  $1.3  billion  from  Mexico's  own funds)  with  a  view  to  reducing
Mexico's  debt  considerably.  The deal  offered  the  banks  a mrnu  of  options  (including
new money  instruments  and  debt  exchanges)  to  choose  from.  Concessions  were
exchanged  as  Mexico  used  its  scarce  foreign  exchange  for  buybacks  while  banks
offered  new money at  below  the  market  rate.  While  the  IFIs  hive  committed  to  fund
a  part  of  the  debt  enhancement bill  over  a  period  of  2 years  in  order  to  help  Mexico
smooth the  expense  through  time,  there  has  been  an  insistence  for  Mexico to  adjust
its  policies  for  promoting  investment  as  a  pre-condition  for  such  supports  in
future.
15Table  1:  F-'1asts  for  coWaring  the  means  across  swap/no-swap  actions
Panel  As SpXflS' of  interest  rat  charged  over  LIBOR
Given  action  d  Swap  No-swap
Variable  4
Mean  Spread  of  interest  1.195  1.378
rate  over  LIBOR  (%)
Standard  error  .021  .017
F-test  for  equality  of  means  across  swap  and  no-swap  actions:
F(1,468),  significance  46.02,  .0000
Panel  B:  New Money as  a  Percent  of  Total  Debt Serviced
Given  action  - Swap  No-swap
Variable  4
Mean of  ratio  of  new money to  7.340  4.894
total  debt  service  (%)
Standard  error  .877  .611
F-test  for  equality  of  means across  swap and  no-swap actions:
F(1,576),  significance  5.24,  .0224
Panel  C:  Natural  Log of  Secondary Market  Debt Price
Given  action  - Swap  No-swap
Variable  4
Mean of  log  of  secondary  3.848  3.695
market  country  debt  price
Standard  error  .047  .033
F-test  for  equality  of  means across  swap and  no-swap actions:
F(1,576),  significance  6.99,  .0084
16Table  2:  Tests  of  thei Model (whether  q-0),  based  on:
(18,  y - #Iz  + q[jt;.,)]  - q[l;  iQj4) (l-J)]  + v,
where  the  dependent  variable  y  is:  spread  of  interest  rate  charged  over  LJBOR  in
Panel  A,  th  new money  as  a  percent  of  total  debt  service  Li.  Panel  8,  and  natural
logarithm  of  the  secondary  market  debt  price  in  Panel  C, z  is  the  vector  explanatory
variables,  and  J-1  iff  the  country  swaps  and J-0  otherwise.
Panel  A:  Deoendent Variable  is  SDread of  Interest  Rate  over  LIBOR*
Variables  (z)  Coefficient  Standard  Error  t-stat.  Signif.
Constant  1.658  .125  13.28  .000
Swvp  (  q  -. 095  .015  -6.30  .000
LIBOR  -. 092  .012  -7.57  .000
External  debt  .322  .039  8.35  .000
Reserves  -. 169  .261  -. 65  .258
Investment  .007  .003  2.14  .016
Debt  service  -. 001  .001  -1.06  .145
Trade  -. 003  .002  -1.98  .024
'Adjusted  R 2 - .375.
Panel  B: Dependent  Variable  is  New Money  as  a  Percent  of  Total  Debt  Serviced'
Variable  (z)  Coefficient  Standard  Error  t-stat.  Signif.
Constant  -1.799  4.850  -. 37  .365
Swap (  q )  .673  .661  1.02  .154
UDM  -. 952  .510  -1.87  .031
External  debt  .972  1.635  .59  .278
Reserves  39.952  11.152  3.58  .000
Investment  .145  .010  1.46  .072
Debt  service  .250  .041  6.10  .000
Trade  .339  .071  5.47  .000
*Adjusted  R2 - .164.
Panel  C:  Dependent Variable  is  Natural  Log  of  Secondary Market  Debt  Price'
Variable  (z)  Coefficient  Standard  Error  t-stat.  Signif.
Constant  4.267  .246  17.33  .000
Swap (  q  .109  .034  3.26  .000
LIBOR  -. 191  .026  -7.37  .000
External  debt  -. 292  .083  -3.52  .000
Reserves  1.932  .566  3.41  .000
Investment  .036  .005  7.08  .000
Debt  service  .013  .002  6.46  .000
Trade  .003  .004  .93  .276
*Adjusted  Rz  - .265.
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19The A£ppmdz
Proof  of  JMa  2:  (a)  When  p-O,  d-0,  and w-b,  the  inrquality  in  (12)  holds,  given
(13).  If  d  > D-o0.-I(ju)  such  that  X<I(p-*),  the  inestment  is  undertaken  even
in  state  wmb  and  the  minim.,  debt  relief  that  the  barik  should  optially  offer  in
this  case  is  zero.  If  d  s  D-o4Q%-I(j+),  a  debt  relief  p can  lead  to  X5I(  i),  so
that:  I-I  if  p>D-d-Qb -apI  and  p  > D-d-a6b-i(JA+).  Since  qaj  >  I(p+)  by  (14),
the  minimau debt  relief  that  can  induce  tho  country  to  undertake  the  investment  is
given  by  (15).
(b)  Suppose that  a  debt  relief,  p>O, can  induce  the  country  to  invest  also  in  state
w-b  at  t-O4 such  that  it  can  pay  D-d-p  at  t-l  if  the  state  turns  out  to  be  either
w-g or  w-b at  t-O.  Since  the  country  pays  aQ6  as  it  forgoes  the  investment  if  wmb
and pays  D-d if  w-g,  the  bank  finds  it  profitable  to  offer  a positive  relief  if  D-
d-p  >  Qbarb+(D-d)wS.  The maxim=  debt  relief  that  the  bank  profitably  offers  (if
undertaking  the  investment  can be  induced)  is  thus  given  by  (16).
(c)  Thus,  a  positive  debt  relief  is  feasible  if  p,,,  2  P&,  i.e.,  if  I(*)  2D-
d-aQ,b].  This  condition  implies  an optimal  debt  relief,  given  by  ?-p  p.  Otherwise
Q.E.D.
Proof  of  Progosition  1:  (a)  Given  the  debt  relief  and buyback  strategies  stated  in
(b)-(c)  and given  (13)-(14),  the  stated  investment  strategies  can be  seen  to  satisfy
(9)-(12).  (b)  Given  any  debt  buyback  de(O,D),  a  positive  debt  relief  is  feasible
ard  optimal  by  the  first  inequality  in  (17)  since  Pm  2  p,,,& if  the  country  is  type
H;  this  relief  is  given  by  p,,  in  (15).  Given  that  the  L  type  country  does  not
engae  in  buyback,  the  optimal  debt  relief  is  zero  by  the  second  inaquality  in  (17).
(c)  If  the  country  is  type  H,  its  expected  utility  by  (5)-(6)  is:
Q 0-I-dp(.,B)  +AjQ3hS4Q12b4b+I  - (aQ1b+T'(A  ))J
where  the  equilibrium  price  of  debt  p(^,B)  (by  (8)]  is  equal  to  Since  over  all
d  this  expected  utility  is  maximized for  dm0, the  type  H country  will  not  buyback
its  debt.  If  the  country  is  type  L,  its  expected  utility  by  (5)-(6)  is  given  by:
20Qrfws-dP(PL,4)  *  lsilqa  p1W*  - ((D'd)W&4ob1rb)  I.
where  by  (8)  p(AC,B)  - [(D-)w.4aQb]J/(rg(D-i)J.  The  typo  L  will  not  .rgp  in
buyback  if  p($,B)  2 AL1.r,  l.e.,  if  *0x 1 ,/(D-a)  2 srArD,-l)  which  holds  when
A4L<tr-  Q.E.D.
Proof  of  Proposition  2: (a)  Given  d(O,D),  p(B)-D-om%b-d-I(p),  w  han X-IGi-()
for  s-b  in (11),  which  along  with  (9)  Implies  that  r(P,B,g)-I,  PA,p.  Given
p(N)-O,  o-N  iuplies  that  X-O  in  (9)  if -g since  D5Qu, wh_ch  iMlie that
I^(p,N,g)-I,  iPP.  If p(N)-O,  o-N  and b,  then  using  (13)  In  (9)  and  (12)
1zqlies  that  I*(p,N,b)-O.
(b)  Given  the  inference  rules  in  (c),  and  given  a(#i)-B,  it  follows  frow.  ti.)  oat
p(B)-p  ~(B)mD-ocb-d-I(p-*)  (of.  argmnsts  leading  to (15)].  Given  '-
pmA.(N)-D-oQ 1-I(P  *),  p(N)"ffb[D-d  -a6  and p.(N)Cp.f(N)  by the  second  inequality
in  (17),  implying  that  p(N)-O.
Now, we  have  to  show that  o(#a) - B and  a(A)-N  and ohe  implied  dE(O,D) is  such
that  p  (B)>O  in  (15) First,  a(Al)-N  iff  E[UIB,p(B)] 2 E[UIN,p(N)].  That  is,
using  (5)-(6),  p(B)-pAn(B),  p(N)-O,  p(B)"  ,  and  (13)-(14),  we  mast  show:
ft 5(Qb-I-P(B)d  +  P(Qw+1d  - (oQ,,+I(  IA*)))]  +
Wb(QoI 4 P(B)d  +  PH(ljlb+I  - (oQm+I(p* 5 )))]  2
_  _
+  - D)]  +  wb[%  +  (Ql-  aQl,)
i.e.,!
(Al)  d  s [(DaQb)  - I(A-*,)  1wr!  'L
Similarly,  o(&)  - N  iff  E[U|N,,p(N)]  a  E[U|B,p(B)].  That  is,  using  (5)-(6),
p(B)-p.  ,  p(N)-O,  p(B)41,  and  (12)-(13),  we  mwst  show:
or[o-I  +  A  Qg+,u  - D)]  +  bQ[% + AR(Qlb  -°b)  2
- +  A(Q,'+  - (omI(u 1)))J  +
WbLQo~I~P(B)d  +  pL(Qlb+p2I - 1
i.e.,
21(A2)  i 2  ( (D-OI)  - I(0-.)  I  5rA 0  -
Since D-aO26|)a  nd  A,,-,  3aE(O,D)  since d4,)O and  d,D  as wsrA4.  This
ut,  howver,  ensure that  p(B)-pj,(B)  in  (15) is  positive,  i.e.,  OD-aQ|- 1 I(p
*).  It  ls  sufficient  to  show  that  d,D.aQ.-I(j-*),  Which  holds since wrg0r<a.
(d) Using (8), p(B) - I,  and p(N) - 1fwS4oQ,bwrWDI.  Sirce  DQjb,  p(B)>p(N).
Q.E.D.
22End Notes
1.By a debt  buyback,  we mean all  debt  conversions  that  involve  a  current  expense.
Debt exchanges  that  are  collaterized  by  foreign  exchange,  and  debt  to  equity  swaps
that  require  current  public  financing  in  the  domestic  coumtry  also  fall  in  this
category.
2.See  Claessens  and  Diwan  (1989,p.271),  Table  15A-1  (source:  the  International
Economics Department,  World Bank).
3.See,  for  example,  the  recent  plans  of  the  Finance  Minister  Miyazawa of  Japan,
President  Mitterand  of  France,  and Treasury  Secretary  Brady of  the  United  States  of
America.
4. Buybacks can be  Pareto  improving,  however,  when they  lead  to  a  larger  economic pie
(when  the  domestic  investment  yields  a  very  low  rate  of  return)  and  when  the
proportion  of  debtor's  assets  that  can  be  seized  by  the  creditors  in  case  of  a
default  is  large,  as  in  ease  of  a  domestic  corporation.
5.0ur  model easily  extends  to  a  case  where  d  is  a  continuous  variable.  Since,  we
do  not  gain  further  economic  insights  from  this  generalization,  we  focus  on
countries'  simple  buyback  and no-buyback  actions.
6. Since  imposing default  penalties  on the  debtor,  through  sanctions  by the  government
of  the  coumtry  in  which the  banks  are  located,  may not benefit  the banks  fully,  there
must exist  some level  of  repayment  that  the  debtor  is  willing  to  make and  the  banks
are  ready  to  accept  in  order  to  prevent  an  outright  default.  Indeed,  Bulow and
Rogoff  (1989)  show that  the  extractable  repayment  is  the  outcome  of  a  bargaining
between  the  debtor  and  its  banks.  To focus  on  the  swap programs,  we abstract  away
from  the  bargaining  problem  and  treat  a  as  given.
7.In  our  model buyback  is  thus  funded by  a  reduction  in  the  current  consumption.
8.0ur  analysis  easily  extends  to  a  continuum  of  possible  values  of  P,  as  we
investigate  within  our  econometric  model  in  Section  4.
9.Froot,  et.  al.  (1988),  consider  only  cases  in  which  p* is  decreasing  in  P.
10. The minidmum  d which  will  solve  the  problem  of  type  H country  is  equal  to  [(D-
aQ.)  - I(p-,)i )  rrf.  This will  imply a  p(B)  - ((D-aQ)  -
ll.These  17 countries  are:  Argentina,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Chile,  Colombia,  Costa  Rica,
Ecuador,  Cote  D'Ivoire,  Jamaica,  Mexico,  Morocco,  Nigeria,  Peru,  Philippines,
Uruguay,  Venezuela,  and  Yugoslavia.
12.We  can  alternatively  specify  that  log(*)  is  normally  distributed.
2313.A  simpler  way to  derive  the  asymptotic  co-variance  matrix  of  the  second  stage
estimators  is  to  rewrite  (18)  as  a  standard  non-linear  regression  model:
Y-t  - g(O'zjt)  + ^t.
where  Zjt  is  the  vector  of  all  regressors  on  the  right  side  of (18),  and  0 is  the
conforming  vector  of  all  coefficients  being  estimated  in  the  first  and  the  second
stage.  Using  the  standard  results  from non-linear  least  squares,  it  follows  that:
Cov()  - A-'CA 1,
where A - Ejt[g'(O'zjt)] 2z2tzjt,  C - Ejt  g'  (O'zJt)]  Mtzjtz  ,  and g'(.)  is  the  derivative
of  g(.).  To  obtain  a  consistent  estimate  of  Cov(W), we  substitute  the  maximn
likelihood  estimate  of  9 in  the  expressions  for  A and  C.
14.The  coefficient  vector  y, whose estimates  are  not  reported  here,  is  found  to  be
highly  significant,  with  level  of  significance  of  almost  0  for  a  test  that  7-0.
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